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Public Support for European Integration: 
A comparative analysis 
 
Kristel JACQUIER 
December, 2012 
 
Abstract: 
This paper proposes to study how socio-economic characteristics shape preferences in European matters. 
It is assumed that social groups threatened by liberalization tend to be more euro-skeptical than others. 
This hypothesis is tested using individual-level data from two rounds of the European Social Survey. 
Controlling for national fixed effects and income, we focus on variables of occupational status 
(International Standard Classification of Occupations ISCO-88, and current occupation). Finally, we 
include a variable of subjective partisan affiliation to make sure that our results are not concealing a 
left/right positioning. We argue that the economic status of agents plays a crucial role in explaining cross-
sectional variations in public support for the European process in each member state. Additionally, the 
partisan affiliation confirms that in European matters, socio-economic forces are not a mere reflection of 
the left/right spectrum.  
 
Soutien à l'intégration européenne: une analyse comparative 
 
Résumé: 
Le présent article propose une étude des déterminants socio-économiques du soutien à l'intégration 
européenne. A l'aide des données Enquêtes Sociales Européennes, nous testons l'hypothèse selon laquelle 
les groupes sociaux qui craignent les effets de la libéralisation auront également tendance à être méfiants 
vis-à-vis de l'intégration européenne. Nous nous focalisons sur les variables d'emploi (CSP, statut 
d'emploi actuel, syndicalisation) en contrôlant par le revenu et le pays d'origine. Une variable de 
positionnement subjectif sur l'échelle gauche/droite est introduite afin de s'assurer que nos résultats ne 
dissimulent pas une affiliation partisane. Les résultats obtenus prouvent que le statut économique des 
agents est une variable déterminante pour expliquer les préférences des européens et souligne 
l'importance de l'intégration européenne comme dimension politique.  
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1 Introduction 
 
 A vast literature in political science has attempted to identify the main deterrents of 
public support for the European Union. This goes from economic benefits at the macro or micro 
level (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993 ; Anderson and Kaltenthaler, 1996 ; Gabel and Palmer, 
1995) to purely cultural factors (McLaren, 2002 ; Diez Medrano, 2003) or contextual variables 
(Brinegar and Jolly, 2005 ; Sánchez-Cuenca, Ignacio, 2000). The question has never been 
settled; therefore it is reasonable to think that several influences work together. As a contribution 
to the existing literature, this paper proposes to study how socio-economic characteristics shape 
preferences in European matters. Using individual-level data from two rounds of the European 
Social Survey, a cross-country analysis is conducted on two samples: the fifteen original EU 
members, and post communist countries.  
 
In international economic relations, integration is defined as « the gradual elimination of 
economic frontiers between independent states. As a result the economies of these states end up 
functioning as one entity » (W.Molle, 2006). This theoretical framework makes clear that 
European integration is an on-going process.  
During the 1950s and the 1960s, a permissive consensus (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970) 
existed in Europe. A large majority of citizens displayed a tacit support for the European process. 
Because of such public disinterest, political elites have been able to pursue their own policy 
interests. After the signing of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986, citizen support for 
European integration started to rise and reached a peak in 1991. By then the European integration 
was considered a purely economic arrangement that brought about macro-economic stability and 
-to some extent- prosperity.  
In the aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty, public opinion was confronted to a more 
complex situation. The political jurisdictions of the European Union (EU) were extended; the 
Union now had a word to say in social policy, environmental and defense matters. The year 1992 
witnessed a sharp drop in public support. Since then, public opinion on European membership 
has stabilized to a sizeable minority of supporters (the rest being hostile or indifferent1). In the 
present day, further integration of the Union boils down to reinforcing constraints. As for 
development plans, the European Council focuses mainly on deepening competition and 
                                                 
1 See Van Ingelgom V, (2012) for a detailed analysis on indifference 
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liberalization, and calls for structural reforms (see Amable et al.,2009 about the Lisbon strategy). 
The free market is constantly re-enforced while social objectives are relegated to the background 
(Amable et al.,2012). 
In this study, we focus on two motives of distrust towards the EU: the economic 
liberalization process and the loss of sovereignty (Beckfield 2009, 2006; Kvist and Saari, 2007; 
de Vries and Kersbergen 2007). It can be argued that the political agenda of the Union has 
become more and more detrimental to the low skilled workers on the labor market2, which leads 
them to be decreasingly supportive of further integration. Adopting a political economy 
viewpoint we focus on the distributive consequences of European integration. 
  
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature. In Section 3, we 
describe the methodology. Section 4 exposes the empirical results and section 5 concludes the 
analysis. 
 
 
 
2 Literature 
 
 
"Citizens are at the core of the European construction: the Union has the imperative to 
respond concretely to their needs and concerns", as evidenced by this declaration of The 
European Council in 1996, further integration requires a strong political support. Thus analysts 
(especially political scientists) attempt to identify what are the main deterrents of public support 
for the European Union (Keohane and Hoffmann, 1990).  
 
 Several studies make the case that citizens evaluate the EU based on macroeconomic 
performances (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Anderson and Reichert, 1995; Gabel and Palmer, 
1995). This is far from surprising since the founders of the European Union justified the 
integration in terms of welfare gains from trade. The economic performances are still essential 
today through the ability of the Union to provide price stability. Nevertheless the explanatory 
power of macro-economic predictors have largely decreased over time, and will not be 
considered in the present analysis. 
                                                 
2 In France for example, the European Constitution was rejected by referendum in 2005 because a large part of the French 
electorate feared the Constitution would enforce a neoliberal economic model 
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 Another field of research focuses on micro economic calculations. Gabel (1998) models 
the personal potential to gain from trade liberalization. He measures the relative competitiveness 
of individuals based on their occupation. And so does the present article. Bruno Cautrès and 
Gérard Grunberg (2007) also emphasize an “elitist bias", they demonstrated that more educated 
and higher-income individuals are more in favor of European integration. 
 
 As previously introduced, the signing of the Maastricht Treaty coincides with the drop in 
Public Support for the EU. Eichenberg and Dalton (2007) argue in favor of a causal relationship 
and document it. Before Maastricht, the Union was limited to economic purposes. The treaty 
expands the number of policy areas for which the EU has some responsibility and strengthens the 
powers of the European Parliament. It is a political shift. They consider Maastricht as a "system 
transforming event that dramatically altered the nature of the integration process". The authors 
emphasize that many citizens want to preserve their national arrangements, notably social 
protection. Indeed Eurobarometer data show that the higher the social expenses, the least citizens 
support EU action on health and social security. They also insist on the influence of the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and its budgetary implications. Citizens dependent on 
state generosity could fear further integration. They argue that, since Maastricht, the politics of 
European integration are animated by distributive concerns. The present study is in line with this 
view. Indeed, even though total income inequality in the EU has declined, within-country income 
inequalities have increased (Beckfield 20093), suggests that there are winners and losers of 
further regional integration. Beckfield (2006) provides three arguments to explain why regional 
integration (both economic and political) should raise income inequality: workers are exposed to 
international competition, labor unions are weakened and market-oriented EU polities should 
drive welfare state retrenchment. Kvist and Saari, (2007) precisely investigate the constraining 
effect of European integration on national welfare states (notably through the EMU). We use the 
political allegiance argument to assume that support for Europe is low when citizens see the EU 
as preventing their national regimes from providing the expected level of social protection (de 
Vries and Kersbergen 2007, 313). 
 
  Labor market or social protection policies are at the very root of socio-political 
compromises that funded post-war European economies. The convergence towards the median 
redistribution level in Europe would unsettle institutional arrangements. According to Hall and 
                                                 
3 Beckfield runs estimates of panel models of within-country income inequality using data from 1972 to 1997 
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Soskice varieties of capitalism (2001), in liberal market economies (LMEs) more redistribution 
would cause a raise in taxation and job losses, whereas in coordinated market economies (CMEs) 
less redistribution would decrease job protection, and lessen investment in specific skills (Iversen 
and Soskice, 2001). As a result European integration might be destabilizing within both types of 
capitalism.  
 
A more recent field of research focus on contextual variables and especially how national 
variables can reinforce or mitigate the impact of previously cited determinants. Brinegar and 
Jolly (2005) intend to comprehend what they call the "socio-tropic evaluations of the effects of 
European integration on national capitalism". In their study, the skill level is taken into account 
through the frame of national factor endowments and varieties of capitalism. They follow Scheve 
(2000) and use the Heckscher–Ohlin model of factor endowment to predict that in countries 
relatively well endowed with skilled workers, skilled workers should support integration while 
less-skilled workers should oppose it. Scheve (2000), focus on the degree of wage bargaining 
centralization. He argues that centralized wage bargaining tends to reduce wage inequality. Thus 
the distributive consequences of integration are mitigated and individuals are less threatened by 
European Integration.  
 
Finally, we use the cleavage theory (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967) in order to draw a 
multidimensional analysis (both cross national and cross sectional variations are taken into 
account). This theory distinguishes two types of cleavages. The national level that results from 
the country economic context (i.e. historical and cultural factors mainly) and the socioeconomic 
level: social divides, class conflicts or some new subdivisions (post-materialism4, age, education 
or access to information). According to Inglehart, post-materialist people should support 
Europeanization. Such an hypothesis won't be tested here because of the lack of empirical 
validation in previous studies (Janssen, 1991; Gabel, 1998a). Furthermore the decline in left/right 
partisanship announced by post-materialists has no empirical foundation (Amable 2007). 
J.Janssen (1991) and Anderson and Reichert (1996) both criticize the idea that the nation state 
represents materialist value. Following Anderson and Reichert (1996) we assume that the 
European Union is a purely economic enterprise. The nation state tends to consider non-
economic goals when the European Union does not.  
                                                 
4 The idea was introduced by R.Inglehart in 1971. The theory of modernization argues that, social development and economic 
prosperity drives political changes in advanced economies. These political changes correspond to the rise of post-materialism 
values among individuals. Materialist values are security, fight against inflation; whereas post-materialist values are self-
development, cosmopolite views...Post-materialist theories predict a decline of the traditional left-right cleavage (Giddens, 1994).   
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All of the studies previously mentioned focus on western Europe, the preferences of post-
communist countries are far less documented. In a study of five transitional countries (Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia) Cichowski (2000) emphasizes three main 
determinants of public support for EU membership: satisfaction with democracy, promotion of 
free market and party cues. Tucker, et al. (2002) confirms that free market supporters welcome 
European integration. They also use individuals' self-assessments of economic progress to 
ascribe "winner" and "loser" statuses, and regard it as the best predictor of support for EU 
membership. 
 
 
 
3 Empirical strategy 
 
3.1 Data 
 
The analysis is based on the European Social Survey (ESS) dataset. The program was 
launched by the European Science Foundation (ESF) and designed to compare social attitudes 
and values across European countries. We focus on the last two rounds of the cross-sectional 
survey: ESS3 (2006) and ESS4 (2008), merged together into one dataset. The ESS provides a 
large data sample (at least 1,500 respondents per country) and employs the most rigorous 
methodologies. Kohler (2007) describes the ESS as the most reliable data for international 
comparisons. We use the question survey below as a proxy to measure public support for the 
European Union:   
“Now thinking about the European Union, some say European unification* should go further. Others 
say it has already gone too far. Using this card, what number on the scale best describes your position?” 
 
Unification                  Unification 
has already                  should go  (Don’t 
gone too far                      further  know) 
00  01  02  03  04  05  06  07  08  09  10  88 
 
* “Unification” refers to further integration rather than further enlargement 
 
 
Even though the scale is not a straightforward response, we expect the respondents who 
support further integration to give a number between 7 and 10, and those reluctant to the EU to 
answer under 4. That’s why we reduced the variable to three ordinal categories.  
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Using such dependent variable it is assumed that further integration reveals support for 
the political agenda of the Union when the survey was made. I argue that some individuals might 
consider unification of Europe as a positive step but are dissatisfied with the course of negative 
integration5 (Scharpf, 1999).  
 
Two groups were defined in order to capture national characteristics6. The EU 15 states 
(the members of the EU prior to the eastern enlargements in 2004 and 2007) the new member 
states (also called post-communist countries). Among the EU 15 states, the study encompasses 
Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, 
The Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden. As far as post communist countries (2004 enlargement 
and afterwards) are concerned, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, 
Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia are included. The appendix provides descriptive statistics. 
 
3.2 Econometric specification 
 
Because the dependent variable of the model encompasses discrete choices that can be 
ordered we run an ordered logit regression. As we have seen in the previous section, the eleven 
original categories (from 0 to 10) were re-coded to three.  
The estimated equation can be defined as: 
 
 
* D + Ci i i i i iy          
 
 
 , ,  ,   and  are parameters to be estimated and *iy is the latent variable, i.e. the 
intensity of the support for the European integration. D is a vector of individual socio-
demographic characteristics (age and gender). E measures the socioeconomic position of 
individuals (ISCO classification, employment status and employment relation). C is a country 
dummy which accounts for any omitted country-specific influence. P stands for partisanship and 
 is the error term.  
 We do not observe *iy , but a variable iy that goes from 0 to 10 and rises when public 
support for the European Union rises:  
 
                                                 
5 Deregulation of national norms rather than new institutions or programs 
6 A pooled regression was carried and provides evidence that our main assumptions hold. We choose to create two group of 
countries to obtain more details on each group and because the literature usually do not include eastern Europe.  In addition, 
separating the countries in two groups allows to reduce the extent of country fixed effects 
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2012.88
   8  
if *1j i jy      
         
For  Where j  are thresholds, with  and  
 
 Only the sign and the significance of the coefficient can be interpreted (King et al., 2000). 
To facilitate the interpretation of the results, odd ratios are provided instead of coefficients. Odd 
ratios allow to compare dummy variables in a meaningful way (within the same regression, the 
magnitude of coefficients is comparable). For example, an odd ratio of 0.5 for the dummy 
variable "female" means that,  holding all other variables constant, the odds of having more 
negative attitudes toward European integration are half as large for women as for men. 
 
3.3 Assumptions 
 
Citizens consider (or experience) distinct benefits from the European Union membership. 
As mentioned before, two motives of distrust towards the EU can be suggested: the economic 
liberalization process and the loss of sovereignty.  
Firstly, we intend to show that social groups reluctant to further European integration are 
the same who traditionally fear trade liberalization, i.e. manual workers. International trade 
models have documented the distributive consequences of trade and individual attitudes towards 
trade (see Rodrik (1995) for a review of the literature). Most of the studies are based on the 
factor endowments model (a combination of the Heckscher-Ohlin model and Stolper-Samuelson 
theorem), and predict that trade liberalization benefits individuals who own the factors with 
which the economy is relatively well endowed and hurts the others (Rodrik and Mayda 2005). 
Scheve and Slaughter (2000) find that in the United-States a two-factor model is a powerful 
predictor of public opinion about trade.  
The second motive is linked to the EMU. Its implementation exacerbated worries about 
European issues. From then on, not only was the European Central Bank delegated the sole 
authority to conduct monetary policy, budgetary policy would be constrained by the Stability and 
Growth Pact. Thus countries which adopted the EMU have to bear constraints on both monetary 
and budgetary policies. And for the others, “more integration” might stand for the adoption of 
the common currency; so citizens who fear a loss of sovereignty are unlikely to call for more 
European integration.  
Considering those issues, it is reasonable to expect less competitive citizens to fear both a cut 
in government spending and a surge in labor market flexibility. 
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Following Gabel (1998) we expect support for the EU to be positively correlated with an 
individual's level of human capital. Income is used as a proxy of such competitiveness. We also 
use the International Labor Classification (ISCO-88) as it reflects the education level of 
individuals. The nine groups are the following: Manager, Professional, Associate professional, 
Clerk, Service worker, Agricultural worker, Craftsman, Machine operator, and Elementary 
worker. Opportunities exist for those skilled enough to compete in the European market so we 
expect the manual laborers to be less supportive of the European integration. In the end we test 
whether social groups threatened by liberalization tend to be more euro-skeptical.  
 
Then we focus on particular statuses: being unemployed, self-employed, or part of a trade 
union. We expect the unemployed to be hostile to liberalization as they rely on social transfers. 
However, Esping-Andersen (1999) emphasize that some outsiders are interested in economic 
policies that maximize their likelihood of finding a job. Some unemployed people might picture 
the EU as a land of opportunity. We intend to figure out whether or not unemployed people 
express distinct preferences from the other respondents. On the opposite self employed should 
welcome a liberal market and low levels of social transfers (Iversen and Soskice, 2001; Guillaud, 
2011). We use a three-category variable to assess whether or not the employment relation has an 
impact on European preferences: wage earners are the reference category and the others are self 
employed and employed in a family business. Using a dummy variable we test trade union 
membership. Trade union members are supposed to be more informed about the risks of 
liberalization for low-skilled workers and should be opposed to it.  
 
 Finally, a variable of subjective partisanship is included. We do not have any strong prior 
expectations regarding the effects of such variable; we use it as a control. Socioeconomic 
characteristics determine partisanship (Gabel, 1998) so we want to make sure that the previous 
results are not concealing a left/right positioning.  
 
Some usual controls are included: gender, age, country dummies. A dummy for the round 
of the European Social Survey is added in order to make sure that the fusion of rounds 3 and 4 
does not bias the estimators. The education level is not presented here because the ISCO 
classification already provides such information. However we run the estimates with the 
education level instead of the ISCO variable and we find the same result as in the literature: The 
more educated individuals are, the more they favor European integration (with a few exceptions 
among new member states, like Bulgaria for example).  
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The main assumptions hold for post-communist countries (the literature suggests that in 
those countries, the most successful individuals promote EU membership. Tucker, et al. (2002) 
evaluate winners and losers thanks to a self-assessment variable while socio economic 
characteristics are used here). However it is useful to separate the two groups so as to capture 
specific traits. There are good reasons to believe that the variables take on a different meaning in 
new member states, and that some variables stand out more sharply. First the factor endowment 
model predicts that individuals whose factor is abundant welcome liberalization while scarce 
factors oppose it, and it appears to us that the skill endowment in eastern Europe is different from 
western countries. Secondly we expect the partisanship variable to work differently. Indeed euro 
skeptical political parties are nationalist parties in both western and eastern countries, but in 
eastern Europe they are traditionally close to the communist party. Consequently, euro skeptical 
individuals in post-communist countries are likely to self-position to the very left of a left-right 
scale.   
 
 
 
4 Estimation results 
 
4.1 Cross-sectional analysis 
 
To facilitate the interpretation of the results, odd ratios are provided instead of categorical 
variable estimates. Table 1 and 2 display the results. Column [1] corresponds to the model 
without partisanship, column [2] involves the same variables but partisanship is included. The 
estimates confirm that pro-EU preferences are significantly and robustly correlated with an 
individual's level of human capital.   
 
First we observe that the wealthier the individuals claim to be, the more they support 
further European integration in both samples (the former and new member states). This is all the 
more interesting that we control for the education level. The lowest incomes are notably reluctant 
to the EU, their odds of having more positive attitudes toward European integration are 29 per 
cent smaller than our reference category ("Coping on present income") for post-communist 
member states, and 24 per cent for the original member states.  
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Among the former member states, the gap from one ISCO category to the other is wide, 
the likelihood to support European integration is 0.55 (45 per cent) inferior for elementary 
workers compared to professionals. The gaps are much less pronounced among eastern member 
states (a 22 per cent drop in the support for elementary workers compared to professionals). The 
issue is addressed in the next section.  
Unemployed people do not stand out as a distinct category compared to paid workers; this 
might be due to heterogeneity among the individuals in the group. In table 1 (the EU 15 states), 
the estimates also point out that people in education strongly support integration compared to 
paid workers (the support goes up by 46 per cent). The employment relation does not predict 
preferences of individuals in European matters.  
Data on union membership are missing for Romania and Latvia, consequently the 
variable was excluded. However tested on the other new member states, union membership is 
insignificant. Concerning the original fifteen member states, union membership is significant at 
10 per cent and as predicted, unionized workers are less supportive of further integration than 
their non-unionized counterparts (by 4%).  
 
Finally, comparing column [1] and [2] confirms that socioeconomic characteristics do not 
operate through a left/right positioning. The inclusion of the variable does not distort the 
previous results: the variables remain significant and the coefficients remain globally unchanged.  
The present analysis weights in favor of the emergence of a new political cleavage around 
European integration (Kriesi et al, 2008). 
 
4.2 Cross-national analysis 
 
Two groups were isolated in the study in order to capture national characteristics. The 
factor endowment model predicts that individuals whose factor is abundant welcome 
liberalization while scarce factors oppose it. But in countries without a comparative advantage in 
skill-intensive sectors, the skills-preference link should be attenuated, or even reversed (Scheve, 
2000). In line with this assumption skilled workers in the former member states strongly support 
integration compared to unskilled workers while the situation is attenuated in post-communist 
states. We notice for example that the support of machine operators is only 16 per cent less than 
professionals in those countries while the support drop by 52 per cent (the odd ratio is 0, 48) in 
the fifteen former member states.  
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Cross national differences also seem to reflect the country education level. Skilled 
individuals in coordinated market economies (where the education system invests on specific 
skills) are thus expected to be less supportive of integration than their counterpart in countries 
with more general education systems (Brinegar and Jolly, 2005). Indeed country dummies reveal 
that countries where, ceteris paribus, negative attitudes towards European integration are most 
widespread are Austria, Finland and Sweden. In the end, estimates demonstrate not only that 
cross national variations are considerable but also that individual skills may work differently in 
different institutional contexts.   
In line with our assumptions, right wing parties are strong supporters of further 
integration. As mentioned above, nationalist parties are close to the communist party in eastern 
Europe7. Euro-skeptical political factions are far left individuals while right wing parties are 
expected to support market liberalization.  
 
In order to complement the cross national analysis, separated country estimates are run. 
Table 3 presents the results in four major countries: France, Germany, Great Britain and Sweden. 
They confirm our findings and some national characteristics stand out.  
 
In the case of Sweden the baseline model is highly relevant. First, occupational variations 
are marked. Secondly self employment is significantly and positively correlated with public 
support (41 per cent superior from wage earners) while union members are 27 per cent less 
supportive of the European Union. The lowest income categories do not significantly differ from 
the reference category (“coping on present income”), however the highest income display a 
strong support for further integration. The same can be said about France where medium and low 
incomes have similar preferences, but very high incomes heavily support European integration.  
The opposite can be observed in Great Britain, where only the last income category is 
negatively correlated with the support. High income individuals do not support the European 
Union. There are two straightforward reasons: first euro skepticism is widespread in Great 
Britain, regardless of the socioeconomic background, secondly the level of redistribution is 
higher in the rest of Europe so rich people might fear convergence towards the other countries. 
The distrust among poor British respondents is consistent with the variety of capitalism 
hypothesis that citizens in LMEs fear a raise in taxation and job losses. Indeed, unemployment in 
Great Britain is historically lower than the European average. Poor workers do not want more 
                                                 
7 with the notable exception of Hungary 
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taxes or lose their jobs. However it has to be noticed that unemployed people in Great Britain are 
37 per cent more supportive of the EU than paid workers (significant at 0.1). It appears that 
people who do not have a job might support a raise in unemployment benefits.  
 
 
 
5 Concluding remarks 
 
 
 Using individual-level data from two rounds of the European Social Survey, a cross-
country analysis was conducted on two samples: the fifteen original member states, and the post 
communist member states. We argued that the European political agenda promotes liberalization 
and budgetary constraints which leads the less competitive citizens to dread a surge in labor 
market flexibility and cuts in government spending.  
 
 The estimates are consistent with the literature. They tend to prove that social groups 
reluctant to further European integration are the same who traditionally fear liberalization, i.e. 
manual workers. Conversely, managers and professionals promote integration in both samples. 
Even though occupational clusters are taken into account, the highest income categories remain 
significantly more in favor of the European process than medium or low income ones. 
Unemployed people do not have distinct preference from workers in our analysis. Union 
membership is significant and as predicted, unionized workers are less supportive of further 
integration than their non-unionized counterparts. Respondents in education were heavily 
supportive of the European Union in both samples.  
 
 We focused on cross national variation comparing former member states to new ones. We 
found that in countries without a comparative advantage in skill-intensive sectors, the skills-
preference link is attenuated. Indeed the distributive consequences of European integration are 
distinct from one institutional setting to another.  
 
 In former member states it sounds clear that since the Maastricht treaty was signed, 
European integration plays a crucial role in shaping national political preferences8. The 
economic policies implemented by the European Union (notably budgetary orthodoxy or 
                                                 
8 For an analysis of political demand in France see Guillaud and Palombini (2006) and Grunberg and Schweisguth (1997) 
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liberalization policies) are unlikely to favor manual workers or people dependent on state 
generosity. Social democratic countries like Sweden best illustrate theses social divides. The 
distributive consequences of European integration appear to us as an important aspect to consider 
for European policy makers. The loss of sovereignty is a burning issue when European 
authorities decide to adopt the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the 
Economic and Monetary Union to overcome the sovereign-debt crisis.  
 It has to be noted that when European issues are concerned, preferences are not aligned to 
traditional partisanship, or well-known dimensions such as economic or cultural drivers. 
Although changes in party system have not occurred until now, European integration appears 
increasing like a political cleavage. 
 
The study emphasizes that the preferences of managers across Europe are similar while 
preferences of managers and manual workers within the same country are distinct, indicating that 
transnational dimensions are strong. Nevertheless, some social groups stand out more or less 
sharply from one country to another. Indeed, we argue that European citizens perceive the 
European Union in a roughly similar manner; but integration has different implications 
depending on the institutional characteristics of the country of residence. As an example, for 
British people European integration might stand for more redistribution, whereas Swedish people 
expect the opposite from the EU. Identifying this contextual preference formation is an important 
tasks for future research.  
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Descriptive statistics 
 
Figure 1- EU 15 states: Average support by country 
 
 
Figure 2- Post communist countries: Average support by country 
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Figure 3- UE 15 states: Main survey question (frequency) 
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Figure 4- Post-communist countries: Main survey question (frequency) 
0 2 4 6 8 10
 
 
 
Note: The polarization at 5 can be interpreted as a status quo bias or, as suggested by Van Ingelgom 
(2012), when the permissive consensus ended, a lot of individuals who used to support the European 
process became indifferent.  
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Figure 5- EU 15 states: average support by ISCO 
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Figure 6- Post communist countries: average support by ISCO 
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Table 1: Ordered logit: Original member states 
 
  [1] [2] 
Demographic characteristics              
Female 0.845*** 0.844*** 
(0.000) (0.000)    
Reference category: 30-54 
16-29 age category 1.183*** 1.179*** 
(0.000) (0.000)    
over 55 age category 0.886*** 0.891*** 
(0.000) (0.000)    
Occupation 
Reference category: Professionals 
Managers 0.802*** 0.819*** 
(0.000) (0.000)    
Assistant professionals 0.744*** 0.756*** 
(0.000) (0.000)    
Clerks 0.667*** 0.682*** 
(0.000) (0.000)    
Service workers 0.615*** 0.618*** 
(0.000) (0.000)    
Agricultural workers 0.555*** 0.568*** 
(0.000) (0.000)    
Craftmen 0.510*** 0.525*** 
(0.000) (0.000)    
Machine operators 0.484*** 0.503*** 
(0.000) (0.000)    
Elementary workers 0.551*** 0.559*** 
(0.000) (0.000)    
Income 
Reference category: coping on present income 
Living comfortably on present income 1.244*** 1.245*** 
(0.000) (0.000)    
Finding it difficult on present income 0.879*** 0.877*** 
(0.000) (0.000)    
Employment status 
Reference category: in paid work 
In education 1.462*** 1.465*** 
(0.000) (0.000)    
Unemployed 1.016 1.037    
(0.741) (0.476)    
non-working 1.018 1.058    
(0.776) (0.377)    
Retired 0.940* 0.957    
(0.053) (0.179)    
doing housework 1.077** 1.109*** 
(0.049) (0.009)    
Others 1.044 1.076    
(0.664) (0.482)    
Employment relation 
Reference category: wage earners 
self employed 1.001 1.011    
(0.978) (0.744)    
working in the family business 0.915 0.920    
(0.234) (0.281)    
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Unions 
Union membership 0.959* 0.945**  
(0.057) (0.013)    
Country fixed effects 
Reference country: Belgium 
Austria 0.585*** 0.597*** 
(0.000) (0.000)    
Germany 0.929 0.910**  
(0.100) (0.041)    
Denmark 1.501*** 1.497*** 
(0.000) (0.000)    
Spain 1.426*** 1.417*** 
(0.000) (0.000)    
Finland 0.653*** 0.660*** 
(0.000) (0.000)    
France 0.868*** 0.875*** 
(0.003) (0.006)    
Great Britain 0.515*** 0.512*** 
(0.000) (0.000)    
Greece 1.398*** 1.382*** 
(0.000) (0.000)    
Ireland 0.881*** 0.895**  
(0.009) (0.028)    
The Netherlands 1.178*** 1.154*** 
(0.001) (0.003)    
Portugal 1.277*** 1.260*** 
(0.000) (0.000)    
Sweden 0.839*** 0.844*** 
(0.000) (0.000)    
Ess round 4 1.095*** 1.102*** 
(0.000) (0.000)    
Partisanship 
Reference: center 
Far-left 0.969    
(0.521)    
Center-left 1.229*** 
(0.000)    
Center-right 1.050*   
(0.053)    
Far-right 0.915*   
(0.090)    
Number of observations  40587 37467 
Pseudo R-Sq. 0.028 0.029    
Log Pseudo likelihood -42685.2 -39340.0    
Chi 2 2425.33 2340.45    
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses * p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 2: Ordered logit: Post communist countries 
 
   [1] [2] 
Demographic characteristics              
Female 0.908*** 0.927**  
(0.002) (0.026)    
Reference category: 30-54 1.108** 1.121**  
16-29 age category (0.024) (0.023)    
1.022 1.017    
over 55 age category (0.609) (0.716)    
Occupation 
Reference category: Professionals 
Managers 0.950 0.977    
(0.429) (0.734)    
Assistant professionals 0.873** 0.885**  
(0.014) (0.039)    
Clerks 0.915 0.944    
(0.162) (0.394)    
Service workers 0.829*** 0.861**  
(0.001) (0.013)    
Agricultural workers 0.820** 0.841*   
(0.034) (0.089)    
Craftmen 0.794*** 0.818*** 
(0.000) (0.001)    
Machine operators 0.833*** 0.885*   
(0.002) (0.058)    
Elementary workers 0.775*** 0.800*** 
(0.000) (0.000)    
Income 
Reference category: coping on present income 
Living comfortably on present income 1.162*** 1.137**  
(0.002) (0.015)    
Finding it difficult on present income 0.789*** 0.777*** 
(0.000) (0.000)    
Employment status 
Reference category: in paid work 
In education 0.980 1.005    
(0.822) (0.957)    
Unemployed 0.954 0.958    
(0.466) (0.544)    
non-working 0.881 0.912    
(0.194) (0.385)    
Retired 0.927 0.946    
(0.115) (0.285)    
doing housework 1.094 1.118*   
(0.128) (0.085)    
Others 0.868 1.028    
(0.384) (0.879)    
Employment relation 
Reference category: wage earners 
self employed 1.014 1.030    
(0.806) (0.629)    
working in the family business 0.980 0.928    
(0.860) (0.540)    
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Country fixed effects 
Reference country: Bulgaria 
Czech Republic 0.196*** 0.198*** 
(0.000) (0.000)    
Hungary 0.275*** 0.280*** 
(0.000) (0.000)    
Estonia 0.233*** 0.242*** 
(0.000) (0.000)    
Latvia 0.173*** 0.172*** 
(0.000) (0.000)    
Poland 0.690*** 0.700*** 
(0.000) (0.000)    
Romania 1.325*** 1.326*** 
(0.001) (0.002)    
Slovenia 0.288*** 0.311*** 
(0.000) (0.000)    
Slovakia 0.365*** 0.380*** 
(0.000) (0.000)    
Ess round 4 0.977 0.990    
(0.479) (0.778)    
Partisanship 
Reference: center 
Far-left 1.051    
(0.440)    
Center-left 1.055    
(0.202)    
Center-right 1.326*** 
(0.000)    
Far-right 1.398*** 
(0.000)    
Number of observations  18493 15862 
Pseudo R-Sq. 0.053 0.054    
Log Pseudo likelihood -18412.6 -15738.3    
Chi 2 2046.65 1795.95    
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 3: Ordered logit: Separated Country Regressions 
 
France Germany Great Britain Sweden 
Demographic characteristics 
Female 0.809*** 0.921 0.949 0.773*** 
(0.004) (0.210) (0.471) (0.001)    
Reference category: 30-54 
16-29 age category 1.061 1.239** 1.351*** 1.243*   
(0.586) (0.039) (0.004) (0.069)    
over 55 age category 0.890 0.855* 0.696*** 0.876    
(0.282) (0.053) (0.000) (0.170)    
Occupation 
Reference category: Professionals 
Managers 0.607*** 0.859 0.669*** 0.812    
(0.001) (0.280) (0.001) (0.180)    
Assistant professionals 0.611*** 0.617*** 0.744** 0.771**  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.017)    
Clerks 0.619*** 0.569*** 0.585*** 0.662*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)    
Service workers 0.500*** 0.463*** 0.722*** 0.547*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000)    
Agricultural workers 0.534** 0.433*** 0.561* 0.495*** 
(0.015) (0.000) (0.093) (0.006)    
Craftmen 0.420*** 0.405*** 0.490*** 0.454*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Machine operators 0.340*** 0.447*** 0.440*** 0.496*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Elementary workers 0.518*** 0.434*** 0.531*** 0.586*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)    
Income 
Reference category: coping on present income 
Living comfortably on present income 1.381*** 1.324*** 1.110 1.248*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.132) (0.004)    
Finding it difficult on present income 0.936 0.785*** 1.004 0.925    
(0.513) (0.010) (0.968) (0.620)    
Finding it very difficult on present income 0.940 0.720** 0.623** 0.750    
(0.820) (0.042) (0.018) (0.339)    
Employment status 
Reference category: in paid work 
In education 1.585** 1.688*** 1.681*** 1.493**  
(0.022) (0.003) (0.007) (0.014)    
Unemployed 1.177 1.092 1.372* 1.138    
(0.304) (0.501) (0.075) (0.559)    
non-working 0.880 1.104 1.110 1.436*   
(0.580) (0.649) (0.520) (0.085)    
Retired 0.803* 0.977 0.982 1.307**  
(0.067) (0.800) (0.864) (0.019)    
doing housework 1.140 1.178 1.456*** 1.087    
(0.388) (0.123) (0.002) (0.765)    
Others 0.584* 1.906** 0.832 0.845    
(0.064) (0.031) (0.676) (0.644)    
Employment relation 
Reference category: wage earners 
self employed 1.046 0.895 1.071 1.412*** 
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(0.744) (0.232) (0.523) (0.005)    
working in the family business 0.903 1.465 1.310 0.528*   
(0.775) (0.180) (0.246) (0.099)    
Unions 
Union membership 0.967 0.894* 0.974 0.731*** 
(0.685) (0.068) (0.701) (0.002)    
Ess round 4 1.179** 1.294*** 1.039 1.115    
(0.012) (0.000) (0.543) (0.115)    
Partisanship 
Reference: center 
Far-left 0.994 1.241 1.336* 0.737*   
(0.965) (0.104) (0.090) (0.061)    
Center-left 1.401*** 1.265*** 1.415*** 0.965    
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.709)    
Center-right 1.135 0.769*** 0.728*** 1.572*** 
(0.150) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)    
Far-right 1.020 0.745 0.508*** 1.697*** 
(0.909) (0.199) (0.001) (0.002)    
Number of observations  3336 4413 3794 3141 
Pseudo R-Sq. 0.028 0.032 0.034 0.034    
Log Pseudo likelihood -3502.9 -4687.5 -3732.9 -3125.7    
Chi 2 201.63 305.71 259.03 218.53    
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses * p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
  
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2012.88
